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THE CASE FOR A SEAGOING WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
Parker B. Smith

I.

INTRODUCTION

At the present time no comprehensive workmen's compensation statute exists to provide coverage for seamen injured
in the course of their employment. The seaman's only existing
remedies consist of an action for maintenance and cure, an
action for breach of the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness, and an action for negligence under the Jones Act. These
remedies offer unsatisfactory protection to the seama for
several reasons. Under the existing remedies the seaman may
be unable to obtain any recovery because the shipowner has
the traditional right to "limit liability" to the seaman at
the outset of the seaman's action for recovery. Furthermore,
the seaman is under pressure not to file claims; fellow
employees are under pressure not to testify; ill will and
poor employment relations are thereby encouraged. In addition,
the seaman must litigate to recover, and must follow a
procedure which is time-consuming, complex, and inefficient.
Thus it is apparent that injured seamen will not have effective remedies until either the remedies available to the
seaman are improved or new remedies are created.
The current system of maritime workmen's compensation
is also unsatisfactory to the shipowner. When unable to
limit liability, the owner has been subject to extremely high
liability for tort damages under both the Jones Act and the
warranty of seaworthiness for conduct substantially less
serious than common law negligence. Recoveries have been
unpredictable, both because the current system is judicially
created and based on broad and amorphous policy considerations,
and because courts differ considerably in their interpretations
of the current remedies.
At the same time, the marine industry has been experiencing serious financial problems in recent years. The
unpredictability and uninsurability of potential damage
recoveries have magnified those financial problems. A
definite workmen's compensation plan is necessary. Under the
traditional remedies, the seaman, the shipowner, and the
maritime industry lack substantial protection and certainty
of results. Such deficiencies can only be eliminated by
legislative guidelines which balance all three interests.

This article will examine in detail the traditional
remedies available to seamen injured in the course of their
employment, with emphasis on recent court decisions affecting
those remedies. An alternative system will be proposed
which consists of a workmen's compensation act for injuries
incurred by seamen in the course of their employment and
one which allows retention of the seaman's traditional
right to maintenance and cure. Current remedies for
breach of warranty of seaworthiness and for negligence of
owner, master, or fellow crewman under the Jones Act have
been eliminated in the proposed act. The proposed revisions
will be analyzed together with the consequences of the act's
adoption.

II.

CURRENT REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO SEAMEN INJURED
IN THE COURSE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT

A.

Maintenance and Cure

A seaman who suffers injury or illness "in the service
of his ship" is entitled to "maintenance and cure" at the
The right includes: (1) unearned
expense of the owner.
wages for the duration of the voyage (or, according to some
authorities, for the duration of the seaman's contract of
employment); (2) medical expenses actually incurred in
treatment of the seaman, or those likely to be incurred
in the future; and (3) a living allowance until maximum
recovery has been achieved. 1
The injury or illness need not be causally related
to the seaman's shipboard duties. It is generally sufficient that the seaman suffer the injury or illness
during his employment period without his deliberate misconduct. 2 Furthermore, the right is not dependent on any
fault of the shipowner in causing the injuries or illness. 3
This right is a valuable one indeed and has long been available
1G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, TBE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 262-71
(1957) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
2 GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 257; cf. Calmar S.S.
Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 529, 1938 A.M.C. 341.
3 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 168-70 (1903).
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to the seaman. 4 The Supreme Court, in Calmar Steamship Corp. v.
Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528, 1938 A.M.C. 341, 343-44,
summed up the policy behind the right to maintenance and
cure in the United States:
[The right was founded upon] the protection of
seamen who, as a class, are poor, friendless and
improvident, from the hazards of illness and
abandonment while ill in foreign ports; the inducement to masters and owners to protect the safety
and health of seamen while in service; the maintenance of a merchant marine for the commercial
service and maritime defense of the nation by
inducing men to accept employment in an arduous
and perilous service.
The seaman's right to maintenance and cure itself does
not guarantee adequate compensatory recovery. The right
has been palatable to the shipowner probably because
recoveries under this right tend to be minimal. Consequently, owners are generally prompt to initiate maintenance
and cure payments, even absent a judgment requiring the
payment.
Prompt payments by shipowners are made also because
of the Supreme Court's ruling in Vaughan v. Atkinson,
369 U.S. 525, 1962 A.M.C. 1131, in which the Court held
a shipowner liable for damages of a punitive nature and for
counsel fees in the event of a wilful and wanton failure to
initiate maintenance and cure. In addition, earlier cases
established that any failure to initiate maintenance and
cure would create liability for any illness or injury
5
caused or aggravated by the failure.
It is not possible precisely to define the content and
extent of the current right to maintenance and cure.
Substantially all American courts agree that the seaman is
entitled to living expenses, wages, and medical expenses
during the period of illness until his maximum cure.
4 1d.

at 169; N. HEALEY & B. CURRIE, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON ADMIRALTY 250 (1965) [hereinafter cited as HEALEY & CURRIE].
5 See, e.g., Cortes
v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc.,
287 U.S. 367, 1932 A.M.C. 1437.
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However, amounts awarded as "maintenance" lie in the
discretion of the trial judge and vary with the forum.
For example, some courts award a flat per diem allowance,
frequently $6.00 or $8.00 per day. 6 Other courts award
only that amount actually needed to "maintain" the
seaman and require strict proof of the seaman's actual
out-of-pocket expenses before allowing any award. 7 Still
other courts may follow provisions of the seaman's
contract which fix the amount of the allowance. 8 In
general, the recoveries are substantially smaller than
damage recoveries or workmen's compensation payments.
The current right to maintenance and cure has been
compared to workmen's compensation. In one respect, the
right is broader than most forms of workmen's compensation,
since the owner's liability under maintenance and cure is
not restricted to injuries or illness "arising out of"
or causally related to the seaman's shipboard duties. To
recover the seaman need only show he was "in the service
of the ship" at the time of his injuries. Although there
is some disagreement as to the outer limits of the "service
the construction applied by modern American
of the ship,"
courts has been extremely liberal. Thus a seaman on shore
leave during a period of rest or relaxation, or even when
intoxicated, has been considered "in the service of the ship."9
Yet in other respects, the right is considerably
narrower than most forms of workmen's compensation. There
is no recovery available under maintenance and cure for the
death of a seaman. And the purpose of the award is not
compensation, but rather protection and care for the seaman
during a limited period. Maintenance and cure payments
6 DeGagne

v. Love's Fisheries, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 632,
1955 A.M.C. 339 (D.Mass.) ($6/day); Irwin v. United States,
111 F. Supp. 912,1953 A.M.C. 913 (E.D.N.Y.) ($8/day).
7 Robinson
v. Isbrantsen Co., 230 F.2d 514, 1953 A.M.C.
306 (2d. Cir.).
8 Curd v.
United States, 118 F. Supp. 921, 922, 1954
A.M.C. 484, 486 (E.D.La.); Sulimen v. Black Diamond S.S. Corp.,
1949 A.M.C. 1419, 1423 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948).
9 Aguilar v.
Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 1943 A.M.C. 451.
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continue only until the point of maximum cure is reached,
or until the seaman is diagnosed as incurable. I 0
Although the right of maintenance and cure is in some
respects narrower than the right of workmen's compensation,
the right as one part of a comprehensive system is particularly valuable. It fulfills a necessary function by
assuring temporary though minimal assistance to the
traditionally poor and improvident seamen who are often
injured at sea or in a foreign port. The remedy itself
is simple, immediately available, and easy to administer.
The seaman need not prove any fault on the part of the
owner in order to recover. The seaman forfeits his right
only by conduct "whose wrongful quality even simple men
of the calling would recognize--insubordination, disobedience
to orders, and gross misconduct."1 1
B.

The Shipowner's Warranty of Seaworthiness

Separate from and not limited by the recovery available
under maintenance and cure is the remedy available to seamen
for injuries caused by the "unseaworthiness" of the vessel.
The concept that the shipowner"warrants" his vessel to be
"seaworthy" is non-statutory and only recently developed by
American courts. Consequently the content of the warranty
is not immutably fixed, and has undergone considerable
alteration in recent years. Basically, the shipowner's
warranty of seaworthiness is a liability-creating promise
by shipowner to seaman that the ship and the ship's gear
(possibly including gear brought on board for temporary use
in port)are reasonably fit for the voyage in question or
for their intended use, and that the personnel aboard ship
are equal in seamanship and disposition to ordinary seafaring
2
men. 1
The duty undertaken by the shipowner is essentially
one of liability without fault, unlimited by conditions
contained in the seaman's contract of employment, and
unlimited by traditional concepts of negligence (including
the concepts of contributory negligence, fault, and proximate
10See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 264-65.
Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511,516, 1949 A.M.C.
613, 617 (dictum).
1 2 Keen v.
Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 1952
A.M.C. 1281 (2d Cir.).
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cause)2 -3 The remedy is derived from the general maritime
law. Hence, in the event the seaman dies as a result of
his injuries, there can be no cause of action under the
law
warranty of seaworthiness-since the general maritime
14
death.
wrongful
for
action
of
cause
no
recognizes
Nevertheless, the concept and the reasoning of the courts
which created it indicate that the shipowner's warranty
of seaworthiness is potentially very inclusive and a
valuable weapon in the seaman's arsenal of remedies against
the shipowner.
Unfortunately for both seaman and owner, the warranty of
seaworthiness is incapable of precise definition. The
landmark decision commonly cited as establishing the warranty, The Osceola, provided that "[t]he law may be considered settled upon the following propositions. . .

(2) that

the vessel and her owner are both by English and American
law liable to an indemnity for injuries received by a
seaman in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship
or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances
appurtenant to the ship." 1 5 As the seaworthiness of The
Osceola had been conceded by all parties, the above statement was dictum. Nevertheless, subsequent decisions
approved it, and American courts have begun a long, yet
unfinished, process of shaping the remedy.
The most important inclusion in the warranty, from
the standpoint of the seaman, was made in Mahnich v.
Southern Steamship Co., 321 U.S. 96, 1944 A.M.C. 1, which
is illustrative of the sharp reversals of precedent which
typify the warranty of seaworthiness and seamen's remedies
in general. Before Mahnich, unseaworthiness and negligence
were entirely separate concepts. If the proximate cause
of the seaman's injury was the negligence of the master,
officer, or fellow crew members, the remedy for unseaworthiness became unavailable, eo instante. 16 In Mahnich the
issue was whether or not a seaman should be indemnified by
the owner of the ship for an injury suffered because of
defective staging. The rope supporting the staging was found
1 3 Cf.

Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85,
698.
1946 A.M.C.
1 4 See Kernan
v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426,
428, 1958 A.M.C. 251, 254.
15The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
16Plamals v. S.S. Pinar Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151, 1928
A.M.C. 932.
104

to have been supplied by a ship's mate, who negligently
overlooked sound rope on board. The Court indicated that
unseaworthiness would henceforth include "operating
negligence," with the result that the seaman would no
longer lose his remedy for unseaworthiness against the
owner even though negligence was proven to be the proximate
cause of his injury. As a result, the presence or absence
of the mate's negligence was imnaterial because the owner
would henceforth be liable for injuries caused by defective
or unseaworthy equipment even when he had exercised due
care in its selection, and even when it had not been
furnished by him negligently. The shipowner's duty to
furnish a seaworthy ship became absolute. Justice Stone
indicated that the vessel was unseaworthy, because the
staging was not fit for its purpose, and the owner had
therefore breached his duty to furnish a seaworthy ship. 1 7
The reasoning which has propelled the warranty of
seaworthiness into the forefront of the current remedies
available to seamen is found in the Mahnich opinion.
Justice Stone emphasized the conditions of the seaman's
employment which made him a ward of the admiralty, thus
18
placing large responsibility for his safety on the owner.
The Supreme Court continued the expansion initiated in
Mahnich through its decision in Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki. 1 9 Reasoning that the shipowners are "in a position
to distribute the loss over the industry," the Court
extended the warranty to include longshoremen employed by
independent stevedoring companies, even when the injury
resulted from the negligence of the stevedores themselves.2 0
Some courts have attempted to carve exceptions to the
1 7 Mahnich

v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103,
1944 t.M.C. 1, 7.
Compare the similar policy which supports the right
of maintenance and cure, text accompanying notes 1-11 supra.
19328 U.S. 85, 1946 A.M.C. 698. See also Comment,
Expanding the Warranty of Seaworthiness: Social Welfare or
Maritime Disaster?, 9 VILL. L. REV. 422 (1964)
2 0Comment,
supra note 19, at 426; Shields & Byrne,
Application of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Longshoremen, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 1137, 1141, 1142 (1963).
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warranty, or to define the warranty as governed by
traditional common law negligence concepts. Those courts
have recognized that the possible extent of the warranty
under Mahnich and following cases is unfair to the shipowner. One enduring exception to the warranty of seaworthiness is the concept of "transitory unseaworthiness,"
introduced in Cookingham v. United States, 184 F.2d
213, 1950 A.M.C..1793 (3d Cir.).
In that case, the
plaintiff seaman had slipped on Jell-O which had been
spilled on the ship's stairway. The court held that the ship
was not unseaworthy because the Jell-O was a foreign substance
which was not an inherent or essential part-of the ship's
gear. The Supreme Court gave added impact to the "transitory
unseaworthiness" exception in. Morales v. city of Galveston,
370 U.S. 165, 1962 A.M.C. 1450, in which it held that the
shipowner's warranty encompassed only the ship itself and
did not include injuries received from defective cargo alone.
However, in Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,373 U.S.
206, 1963 AoM.C. 1649, the Court extended the warranty to
injuries caused by defective cargo containers and indicated
that the warranty was not confined solely to the ship
itself.
The Mahnich and Seas Shipping Co. cases indicate that
potentially there are very few injuries aboard ship which may
not be covered by the warranty. Yet some lower federal
courts and the Supreme Court in a few instances have recognized
the extreme inequity of holding the owner to absolute liability
for injuries which he could not have foreseen or prevented.
It is possible that the broad policy of protecting the
improvident seaman from the perils of the sea, which
policy has been operative in the expansion of the warranty
of seaworthiness, may be recognized as insufficient to justify
the extremely high damage recoveries now available regardless
of the owner's negligence in causing the injury or protecting
the seaman. Until then, the warranty remains amorphous,
broad, and unpredictable.
A. The Jones Act
When Osceola was decided, the seaman had no remedy
against the shipowner for injuries caused by negligence
of master, owner, or fellow crewmen other than for maintenance and cure. To give the seaman such a remedy, Congress
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passed the Jones Act in 1920.

The Act provided:

Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in
the course of his employment may, at his election,
maintain an action for damages at law, with the
right of trial by jury and in such action, all
statutes of the United States modifying or extending
the common law right or remedy in cases of personl
21
injury to railway employees shall apply ....
Even a casual reading of the statute indicates it was
loosely drafted, and soon after its enactment, American
courts were confronted with a large number of Jones Act
actions which raised basic questions concerning the nature
and extent of the remedy. After fifty years of judicial
interpretation, it is still impossible to state categorically
the meaning of certain portions of the Jones Act, though
several aspects of the Act have been interpreted fairly
consistently by the courts. There is some indication that
the Act was intentionally drafted in general terms to permit
the courts to develop and alter the seaman's remedies under
the statute in light of changing conditions within the
maritime industry and changing concepts of the maritime
industry's duty to its employees. 2 2 An evaluation of how
well the Act has provided the seaman remedies proportionate
to his changing needs can only be made after an examination
of courts' interpretations of ambiguous portions of the Act.
1. Election. The Jones Act provides that the seaman
may maintain an action "at his election." A long series of
cases established that the phrase entitled the seaman to
maintain a Jones Act suit or an unseaworthiness action in
addition to his claim for maintenance and cure, but that the
seaman was not entitled to have cumulative damage recoveries
23
under the Jones Act and the warranty of seaworthiness.
2146 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
2 2 Kernan

v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 1958

A.M.C.
251.
2 3 GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 1, at 288; cf. pacific
S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 1928 A.M.C. 1932.
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That is, he may plead both claims in the same action and
may go to the jury on both claims. Any favorable jury
verdict will be upheld on appeal if supportable under either
claim. 2 4 The plaintiff must elect whether to sue "in
admiralty" without a jury, or "in law" in state or federal
court with or without a jury. But if the-plaintiff elects
to sue "in law" with a jury, he may obtain a jury determination of an unseaworthiness claim, even though unseaworthiness is a concept arising from the general maritime law,
which does not permit jury determinations, and not from the
25
common law, which does permit jury determinations.
2. Conditions Precedent: Employment and Injury. The
remaining terms of the Jones Act have undergone substantial
judicial interpretation. The act covers any seaman who
shall suffer personal injury "in the course of his employment."
The courts have given an extremely broad definition
to the seaman's "course of employment," and that phrase
can no longer be considered equivalent to its counterpart
in most workmen's compensation statutes. In fact the
definition has become the equivalent of the "service of the
ship" formula used in maintenance and cure actions. 2 6 Thus,
the seaman may be "in the course of employment" when
returning to the ship from shore leave; when engaging in
recreational activities during shore leave, when first
reporting for duty, or when leaving the ship after being
27
discharged.
Predictably, the courts have given a very inclusive
definition of those injuries which are compensable under
the Jones Act. Assaults by superior officers or fellow
crewmen are included as well as injuries caused by a
negligent omission to furnish medical care or maintenance.2 8
24
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1,
at 289.
2 5 Romero
v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358
U.S. 354, 1959 A.M.C. 1603.
2 6 See Braen
v. Pfeifer Oil Transportation Co., 361 U.S.
129, 133, 1960 A.M.C. 2, 5 (1959).
2 7 1d.
at 132, 1960 A.M.C. at 4.
2 87Cortes v.
Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367,
1932 A.M.C. 1437; Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 1930
A.M.C. 1243; Kowhler v. Presque-Isle Transportation Co., 141
F.2d 490, 1944 A.M.C. 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S.
764.
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The courts have consistently imposed high tort damages
against owners under the Jones Act, including lump sum
awards based on life expectancy.29
3. Negligence. At the same time, the inclusive definition
of "negligence" under the Jones Act has approached that of
strict liability. For example, a plaintiff suing under the
Jones Act must establish the traditional elements of a
negligence action--duty, breach of duty, causation, damage.
However, the seaman's burden of showing the existence of
a duty is easily satisfied because the owner's duty is
statutory and automatically applies to seamen working in the
course of their employment. Consistent with the holdings
under actions for maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness,
courts in construing the Jones Act have made it abundantly
clear that seamen are wards of admiralty, and that the owner's
30
duty to the seaman is a duty of "fostering protection."
The breach of duty of "fostering protection" is easily
proven by the seaman. The courts frequently define the
breach as a "negligent" failure to provide a safe place
to work or a seaworthy ship, and include within the breach
of all negligent acts (both misfeasance and nonfeasance) by
masters, officers, or fellow crewmen. 31 The extremely broad
definition of "negligence" has tended to create a form of
strict liability or an absolute duty on the part of the
owner.32
The seaman's burden of proving causation, the third
29Neal v. Saga Shipping, 407 F.2d 481, 1969 A.A.C.
280 (5th Cir.) ($53,587); Maillard v. American Export Isbrandtsen, 406 F.2d 322, 1969 A.M.C. 45 (2d Cir.) ($50,000);
Vaccaro v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 405 F.2d 1133, 1969 A.M.C. 503,
(2d Cir.) ($15,000); Naglis v. Waterman S.S. Co., 390 F.2d
178, 1968 A.M.C. 626 (3d Cir.) ($35,000); Putnam v. Mathilde
Bolten, 298 F. Supp. 660, 1969 A.M.C. 951 (D. Md.) ($27,500);
The Midnight Sun, 291 F. Supp. 353, 1968 A.M.C. 2474 (D. Mass.)
($3,500; $8,000; $4,000; $12,000; $1,860; $24,000; $3,400;
$14,000; $2,000; $17,460).
3 0 Cortes v. Baltimore
Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367,
372-76, 1932 A.M.C. 1437, 1441-45.
3 1 GILMORE

& BLACK, supra note 1, at 312.
an illustration of "negligence without fault," see
Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 1958 A.M.C.
251. Cf. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 314.
3 2 For
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element of an action under the Jones Act, has been ameliorated
substantially by the admiralty equivalent of res ipsa
loquitur. The concept was initiated in Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 46 (1948), and was described as a rule
granting seamen "permissible inferences from unexplained
events." Like the doctrine of res ipsa locruitur, the
'rpermissible inference" concept is not always usable, and
does not guarantee success even when usable. Nevertheless,
the rule has often been invoked in Jones Act cases, and
the seaman has often satisfied the causation element by
proving injury, and by showing that it could have been
caused by the negligence of owner, master, or fellow crewman.
The seaman's burden of proving damage is no more
difficult than that of proving damage in a common law
negligence action. A long series of cases has established
that the Jones Act was a compensatory statute, with
recoveries in the event of the seaman's death limited to
the pecuniary benefits which the beneficiaries might
reasonably have received had deceased not died from his
injuries.3 3 Nevertheless, the recent case of Petition
of Den Norske Amerikalinge A/S, 276 F.Supp. 168, 1967
A.M.C. 1965 (N.D. Ohio), has indicated that punitive damages
may be available under the Jones Act where the master of a
vessel exhibited wilful and wanton misconduct toward the
crew, and where the owner ratified the misconduct. Although
the case has been reversed, the reasoning of the district
court allowing punitive damages has been allowed to stand.
That reasoning, based on the broadest possible policy
considerations--protection of the improvident seaman as
a ward of admiralty--has injected unpredictability into the
remedies of maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness, and
the Jones Act. The reasoning is representative of the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in seaman's personal injury
actions generally, and it is reasonable to assume that in
the future, owners will be faced with punitive damages
under the Jones Act, and based on the same policy considerations, under the warranty of seaworthiness.

3 3 See

Petition of Southern S.S. Co.,
358, 360, 362 (D. Dela. 1955).
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135 F. Supp.

II.

THE CURRENT SYSTEM:

DISADVANTAGES TO THE SEAMAN

Current remedies available to the seaman injured in the
course of his employment are broad, inclusive, and subject to
further judicial expansion. However, some inherent disadvantages
are built into the current system for the seaman seeking to
recover for injuries suffered in the course of his employment.
A.

Jones Act

In a suit under the Jones Act, the seaman must prove the
elements of a traditional negligence action. 3 4 Although the
Supreme Court has reduced the causation element by adopting
the doctrine of "permissible inferences from unexplained
events," the seaman is not guaranteed recovery by that doctrine,
and in some cases the seaman may have considerable difficulty
in proving the causation element. Although the courts have I
alleviated the seaman's burden of proving breach of duty,3 5
he is required, except in cases involving the breach of a
safety statute, to prove some type of knowledge on the part
of the master or owner of the unsafe condition which caused the
injury.
In addition, there are some disadvantages to a seaman
bringing suit under the Jones Act. The Jones Act is enforceable
by an action at law, usually in federal court. The trials tend
to be expensive and time-consuming. The dockets are already
overcrowded in many jurisdictions. Often the seaman waits
years until his action is brought and even longer for his case
to be decided. Such conditions must be improved.
B.

Warranty of Seaworthiness

Possibly because of the above disadvantages, suits under
the Jones Act have become less popular in recent years than
actions under the warranty of seaworthiness. The seaman's
action for unseaworthiness also contains some serious disadvantages.
3 4 Text
3 5 Notes

accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
31-32 supra and accompanying text.

il1

The extent of the shipowner's warranty is not well-defined.
Many courts have been unable to accept the potentially wide
definition of the warranty suggested by some recent Supreme
Court decisions. 36 The result has been a growing uncertainty
and confusion surrounding the extent of the warranty.
In addition, there are serious inequities to the seaman
common to both the action for unseaworthiness and the action
for negligence under the Jones Act. Under the present system
claims are discouraged or settlements are encouraged for
reduced amounts; fellow employees are discouraged from
testifying; ill will and poor employment relations are
engendered. 3 7 Finally, under the present system, counsel
fees tend to be high, witnesses tend to be difficult to
locate because of the mobile nature of the maritime industry,
and evidence tends to be difficult to obtain. Most of the
disadvantages arise because the current system is a judiciallycreated one, enforceable by traditional actions at law.
C.

Maintenance and Cure

The remedy of maintenance and cure is the most acceptable
to the seaman, but the recoveries are relatively small and,
in most cases, insufficient to compensate the seaman for his
illness or injuries. Nevertheless, the payments are assured.
They do insure payment of the seaman's medical bills, payment
of the seaman's wages, at least for the duration of the voyage,
and payment of a per diem allowance which enables the seaman
to convalesce without acute financial worries.
D.

The Shipowner's Right to Limitation of Liability

All three of the current remedies available to the
seaman injured in the course of his employment may be restricted
or eliminated by the peculiar right of the shipowner to "limit
his liability" to the seaman at the outset of the seaman's
action for relief. The shipowner's right is defined by federal
3 6 See

Diamond, Maritime Personal Injury: What Court, Judge
or Jury?, 28 ALA. LAW 387, 394 (1967).
37 E. CHEIT & M. GORDON, OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY AND
PUBLIC POLICY 958 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CHEIT & GORDON].
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statute which provides in part:
(a) The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether
American or foreign, for any embezzlement, loss, or
destruction by any person of any property, goods, or
merchandise shipped or put on board of such vessel,
or for any loss, damage or injury by collision, or for
any act, matter or thing, loss damage, or forfeiture
done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity
or knowledge of such owner or owners shall not . . .
exceed the amount or value of the interest of such
38
owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending.
Before the statute was enacted the doctrine of limitation of
liability was specifically rejected by many early American
courts, which held the owner's liability was limited only
by the amount of the loss and his ability to pay. 3 9 In 1848,
the full extent of the potential liability under those early
cases was exposed in The Lexington, 47 U.S. 344,
(1848), and there soon followed the First Limitation of
Liability Act. The act was vaguely worded and provided the
basis for judicial lawmaking on a grand scale. 4 0 The shipowner
was favored by the judiciary at the outset, 4 1 but a 1935
amendment gave greater protection to the seaman. 4 2
The
amendment, however, only applied to seagoing vessels and was
3842 U.S.C. § 183 (1958). For an interesting discussion of
the history of the doctrine, which originated in the Seventeenth
Century, see Baer, Down to the Seas Again, 40 N.C.L. REV. 377,
397 (1962).
39 See The
Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 126 (1894); Comment,
Shipowner's Limitation of Liability--New Directions for an Old
Doctrine, 16 STAN. L. REV. 370-71, 372 (1964).
40See Comment, supra note 39, at 374.
41 The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468 (1886) (value of shipowner's interest determined at end of the voyage and did not
include insurance or freight).
4246 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1964) (limitation fund of $60 per
ton to be provided by shipowner).
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43
soon recognized as insufficient even where.applicable.
Under the current statute, limitation of liability is
not available in the event the owner had "privity or knowledge"
of the cause of the loss. The requirement is sufficiently
vague that courts have interpreted it in light of changing
conditions within the maritime industry. Nevertheless, at
least some generalizations are possible:"The 'privity or
Where the
knowledge' must be that of the owner himself.
vessel is owned by a corporation, the corporate owner will be
held to have the requisite knowledge if a corporate officer
"sufficiently high" in the corporate management is chargeable
with the knowledge or is responsible for the loss on a
negligence rationale. 4 5 The corporate owner may delegate
certain duties to inferior officers and thereby insulate the
owner from liability. However, certain duties are non-delegable
and will not insulate the corporation from financial responsibility. The duty of providing a seaworthy ship is such a
Similarly, the owner has a non-delegable
non-delegable duty. 4 6
duty to select a properly qualified crew and master, and at
least where the incompetence of master, officers, or fellow
crewmembers is known to the owner, limitation of liability
will be denied.4 7 Even where such incompetence is not directly
known by the owner, limitation may be denied on the basis the
shipowner committed "statutory fault" by failing to properly
48
man the vessel.
In general, the concept of limitation of liability has
shown considerable vitality in recent years, even though the
policy favoring limitation is basically contrary to the
policy favoring liberal recoveries for the seaman injured in
the course of his empl6yment. 4 9 In most situations involving

4 3 J.

F. Gerrity, A current review of attacks and defenses
concerning the right of shipowners to claim limitation of liability
in the United States, speech delivered Oct. 3, 1968, before the
Association of Average Adjusters of the United States, at 4-6.
44GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 698.
451d. at 701.
4 6 The Osceola,
189 U.S. 158 (1903).
4 7 GILMORE
& BLACK, supra note 1, at 702 n. 96.
4 8 Id.
at 702-03.
4 9 See, e.g., In
re Colonial Trust Co., 124 F. Supp. 73, 1955
A.M.C.1290 (D. Conn.1954).

114

the injury of a seaman, the shipowner will not be able to
obtain the benefits of the limitation statute since the
owner's interest in the vessel and pending freight is usually
greater than the claims against the owner and the vessel,
and, furthermore, because the owner's "privity or knowledge"
may deny limitation in the case of seagoing vessels. However, many courts continue to construe the statute liberally
in favor of the owner in order to effectuate the purpose of
the Act, which is the encouragement of investment in the
maritime industry and the development of a strong merchant
marine. In addition, the judicial expansion of remedies
available to seamen injured in the course of their employment,
in combination with other economic factors affecting the
maritime industry, has caused the industry to marshall
opposition to any modification of the current statute. 5 0 The
result has given renewed vitality to the peculiar concept of
limitation of liability, with foreclosure or significant
restriction of recovery where plaintiff seaman suffered injury
aboard a small vessel of light tonnage or aboard any vessel
reduced to insignificant value
following a collision, fire,
51
disaster.
marine
other
or
III.

THE CURRENT SYTEM:

DISADVANTAGES TO THE OWNER

The current tripartite system of remedies available to the
seaman injured in the course of his employment presents some
serious inequities to the shipowner. In most cases, the owner
will not be able to limit liability under 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1964),
either because his interest in the vessel exceeds claimants'
demands, or because his "privity or knowledge" forecloses the
statutory right of limitation. When unable to limit his liability,
the owner is confronted by two serious inequities in the present
system: (1) the possible imposition of extremely high damage
recoveries for conduct substantially less serious than common
law negligence, and (2) the lack of predictability concerning
both the amount of claimants' recoveries and the extent of
the owner's responsibility.
50J. F. Gerrity speech, supra note 43, at 9.
5 1 Cf. California Yacht Club v. Johnson, 65 F.2d 245, 1933
A.M.C. 943 (9th Cir.).
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Those basic inequities have been discussed in relation
to the extent of the current remedies available to the seaman
injured in the course of his employment. Those inequities
are compounded by two factors: (1) the declining financial
condition of the marine industry, and (2) the increasing unavailability of insurance adequate to cover the owner's liability
Lo the seaman under the current system. 5 2 The unavailability
of adequate insurance is of intense importance to the maritime
industry, which has always been extremely conscious of the
need for comprehensive insurance to cover the myriad risks
attendant to marine work.
There are other disadvantages. The present system is enforceable by actions at law or in admiralty, usually in federal court.
The trials tend to be expensive and time-consuming for the
owner as well as the seaman. Rights and liabilities are often
not fully determined for a period of years following the
seaman's injuries. For the owner as well as the seaman, counsel
fees tend to be high, witnesses are difficult to locate, and
evidence seems to be difficult to obtain. Furthermore,
litigation encourages ill will and poor employment relations
within the marine industry.
IV.
A.

THE PROPOSAL: A SEAGOING WORKMEN'S COMPENATION ACT
The Constitutional Power of Congress to Enact a
Seaman's Compensation Act

Congress has been given broad powers to alter the maritime
law as changing conditions require. 54 The courts have often
recognized the Congressional power to alter or modify the maritime law. An example is O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge and
Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 1943 A.M.C. 149, which provided:
52J. F. Gerrity speech, supra note 43, at 6, 12 & 13.
5 3 CHEIT
& GORDON, supra note 37, at 58.
54 UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION art. III, § 2: "The judicial
power [of the United Statesl extends to all cases of admiralty
or maritime jurisdiction .

.

.

. Congress

[has]

the power to make

all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution all powers vested by the Constitution in the government
of the United States."

116

There is nothing in that grant of jurisdiction . . .
to preclude Congress from modifying or supplementing
the rules of that law as experience or changing
conditions may require. This is so at least with respect
to those matters which traditionally5 have been within
the cognizance of admiralty courts.
A compensation act of the type proposed by this article
would not contrave the "Savings to Suitors" clause of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, First Session, First Congress, Chapter
20, section 9, 1 Stat. 76-77: "[The district courts] shall
also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. . . saving to suitors,

in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the
common law is competent to give it."
There could be no contravention because certain pre-existing
common law remedies have been made unavailable in state courts.
Other remedies available to seamen are not common-law remedies
which could be "saved" under the above quoted section. For
example, today the seaman's exclusive remedy for negligence
is a statutory remedy in the form of the Jones Act. 46 U.S.C.A.
§ 688 (1964). The companion remedy for unseaworthiness is
exclusively provided by the general maritime law and not the
common law. Both these major remedies do not fall within the
purview of actions that must be "saved" for the district courts
under the Judiciary Act. Thus, assuming that changing conditions
require the adoption of an exclusive seaman's compensation act,
Congress could constitutionally provide such an act.
B.

Effects of Adoption

Today the concept of workmen's compensation has achieved
tremendous acceptance in the United States. Over 78 per cent
of the total labor force in the United States is now covered
by some form of workmen's compensation. 5 6 The various forms of
compensation vary widely, but most acts attempt to provide in
the most dignified, efficient and certain form, financial and
medical benefits for victims of work-connected injuries. 5 7
5 5 Accord

United States v. Matson Navigation Co., 210 F.2d
610, 1953 A.M.C. 272 (9th Cir.).
5 6 CHEIT
& GORDON, supra note 37, at 2.
57 1LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2.20, at 5.
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Most acts also attempt to allocate the burden of recoveries
to the consumer of the industry's product. 5 8 The more modern
workmen's compensation acts have two functions: wage restoration
and rehabilitation. That is, they attempt to insure that the
worker will not be a burden to society, and they perform their
function by assuring the worker a limited recovery, and by
requiring the assumption of limited, non-fault liability on the
59
part of the employer.
There is no comprehensive workmen's compensation statute
applicable to seamen injured in the course of their employment.
The current remedies available to the seaman are unsatisfactory
both to the seaman and to the shipowner. Adoption of a comprehensive, liberal workmen's compensation act to apply to seamen
injured in the course of their employment would have the following effects:
(1) Uniformity would be achieved. Recoveries under
workmen's compensation acts are generally governed by payment
schedules. Owners and seamen would be able more accurately to
predict recoveries under the proposed system.
(2) The burden of payments could be placed on the consumer.
Today employers insure against liabilities created under workmen's compensation. The security records of private carriers
are remarkably stable. 6 0 More important, any employer can obtain
compensation coverage at competitive rates, and can thus pass
the cost on to the consumer.
(3) Efficiency would be increased. The modern compensation
acts impose on an insurer, state fund, or private carrier, primary
obligations for the efficient administration of their provisions.
The rights of the workmen are intially enforceable through
commission hearings, which are characterized by informality and
speed. In addition, counsel fees generally are regulated, and
procedural and administrative expenses are minimized.
(4) Fairness to all parties would be ensured. The modern
compensation acts recognize that fairness to the employee demands
the recovery of lost wages and the provision for effective
rehabilitation, with foreclosure of the possibility of dramatic
recoveries available under traditional judicial procedures. The
5 8 id.
5 9 CHEIT & GORDON,
6 0 Id. at 94.

supra note 37, at 99.
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modern acts also ensure fairness to the employer by providing
non-fault liability limited to a certain amount, with foreclosure of certain common law defenses which could eliminate
responsibility under traditional judicial procedures.
C.

One Possible Approach:

A Proposed Act

It should be noted at this point that the purpose of this
paper is the encouragement of some legislation which would have
the beneficial results discussed herein. Therefore, the author
has attempted to suggest what form that legislation might
take. 6 1 The appended text should be considered as evidence
of a satisfactory statute, and not as the final form of such
a statute.
The proposed act, as written, contains a number of special
features which would encourage its acceptance by the maritime
industry. The proposed act applies only to "seamen" because
primarily remedies available to "seamen" are unsatisfactory.
The remedies available to other maritime workers injured in the
course of their employment may also be unsatisfactory. If
that is the case, the coverage of the act should be extended to
include those other maritime workers.
Coverage under the proposed act may not be avoided under
the shipowner's right of limitation of liability. The act
displaces the need for limitation, by making the risks of the owner
predictable, and therefore insurable. In addition, the right
of the shipowner to obtain limitation of liability has worked
considerable injustice under the current system of remedies,
and should be eliminated.
The liability under the proposed act is exclusive, A
workmen's compensation act cannot be successful unless it is
exclusive. The only exception is the provision for the continuation of the seaman's traditional right of maintenance and cure.
As discussed previously, the traditional right of maintenance
and cure is a useful temporary form of relief. It has long
been acceptable to both shipowner and seaman and has usually
worked efficiently and without undue delay. Provision could be
made for deduction of payments under the proposed act which would
also be available under maintenance and cure, thus foreclosing
any possibility of double recoveries under the new system.
61Appendix A.
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V. SUMMARY
A new system to adequately insure seamen injured in the
course of their employment is needed for reasons apparent to
anyone who has examined thenature of the seaman's remedies
against the shipowner in the event he is injured. This article
has proposed a system consisting of a Seaman's Compensation
Act, with retention of the seaman's traditional right of
maintenance and cure, and rejection of the seaman's rights under
the Jones Act and warranty of seaworthiness. The proposed
system would require abrogation of the shipowner's right of
limitation of liability with respect to seamen covered by the
proposed act. The proposed system hopefully could be fair
and adequate to both shipowners and seamen.
It could substantially improve the current remedies available to seamen injured
in the course of their employment. Any seaman should be able
to expect nothing less than proper remedies. No reason exists
to exclude the workmen on the sea from proper medical coverage
and wage compensation in the event of his injury when modern
workmen's compensation plans exist throughout the world to
protect land-based workmen.
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APPENDIX A

PROPOSED SEAMAN'S COMPENSATION ACT
01.

Definitions.
a.

b.

02.

Coverage.
a.

b.
c.

03.

For the purposes of this act, the term "employee"
includes any seaman who does any sort of work aboard
a ship in navigation, and includes the master, officers,
or crewmembers of said ship.
The term "employer" includes any person, partnership,
corporation, or association, any of whose employees
are employed in marine employment, in whole or in part,
upon the navigable waters of the United States, or
between any state and territory of the United States,
or between any foreign nation and the United States.

Compensation shall be payable under this act in
respect of disability or death of an employee, but only
if the disability or death results from an injury
occurring in the course of said employee's employment,
and if compensation for the disability or death may not
validly be provided by the legislation of any state of
the United States.
Compensation shall be payable irrespective of fault as
the cause of injury or death.
Compensation shall not be subject to any limitation of
liability inuring to the benefit of owner or insurer
under any statute of the United States, any provision
of any insurance contract, or any court decision.

Exclusiveness of Liability.
a.

The ability of an employer described in section 02
of this act shall be exclusive and in place of all
liability of such employer to the employee, his legal
representative, and anyone entitled to recover damages
from such employer at law or in admiralty on account
of such injury or death, except that the employee shall
retain his right of maintenance and cure, provided there
is no double recovery for expenses or medical bills
under the combination of this act and the right of
maintenance and cure.
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04.

Compensation for Disability and Death.
a.

05.

Compensation for disability and death of an employee
shall be paid on a schedule as specified in sections
908, 909 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.-901 (1957).

Commission
In order to interpret and effectuate the provisions
of this Act, a Seaman's Commission for Compensatory
Matters shall be established.
a.

Compensatory claims submitted by employees to their
employers which are not settled shall be adjudicated
by the Commission. The Commission shall have original
jurisdiction over any actions arising under the Act.

b.

Any party to an action arising under the Act shall have
the right to judicial review by direct appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for th circuit in which
the Commission hears the claim, The United States
Supreme Court shall have the right to review any final
adjudication of a Court of Appeals in an action arising
under the Act.

c.

The Commission shall be composed of five members
appointed by the President of the United States on the
basis of merit and experience attained in the maritime
industry. Such members shall serve a three-year term.
Appointments may be successive as the President so
elects. The Commission shall be located in

d.

Suits based on a cause of action arising under the Act
shall not be allowed unless filed within eighteen (18)
months of the occurrence giving rise to the Employee's
claim.

e.

The Commission shall have the authority to promulgate
rules and regulations consistent with the provisions
of this Act and through such rules and regulations to
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effectuate and clarify the provisions of the Act.
f.

The Commission shall have the authority to establish
procedures whereby investigatory actions may be
instituted to provide full evidentiary production of
all relevant facts pertinent to a particular action.
Such procedures shall include, but not be limited to,
the appointment of Commis sion examiners to investigate
and file documented reports of events surrounding
any particular claim before the Commission.
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